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The James D. Hopkins Memorial Lecture
Pace Law School, October 25, 2008
The Most Dangerous Power of the Prosecutor
Bennett L. Gershman*
I. Introduction
A. Judge James D. Hopkins
This is the James D. Hopkins Memorial Lecture in honor of
Judge Hopkins, who was the Dean of Pace Law School from
1982 to 1983 and earlier served with great distinction on the
New York Appellate Division’s Second Judicial Department.
Judge Hopkins served on that court when I worked in the spe-
cial prosecutor’s office, and as head of the appeals bureau, I ar-
gued several cases in Judge Hopkins’ court.  One case stands
out, the case of Salvatore Nigrone v. Murtagh.1  It was an exten-
sive undercover investigation.  My office used informants, wire-
taps, and a sham arrest to expose corrupt attempts to influence
criminal cases.2  As a result, a grand jury indicted three judges
and two lawyers for perjury before the grand jury.3  On a motion
* Professor of Law and James D. Hopkins Chair, Pace University School of
Law.  B.A., Princeton University; J.D., New York University School of Law.  I
would like to thank Dean Michelle Simon for conferring on me the Hopkins Chair.
I would also like to express much gratitude to my colleagues, Professors Michael
Mushlin, Donald Doernberg, and Lissa Griffin, for their support and
encouragement.
1. 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 1974).
2. Id. at 514-15.
3. Id. at 516.
1
1
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to dismiss the indictments, the appellate division upheld the
perjury charges but condemned my office’s investigation as “in-
tolerable,” “illegal,” “outrageous,” “overzealous,” “pernicious,”
and a “corruption and manipulation of the criminal justice
system.”4
After Judge Hopkins and I found ourselves together in the
same law school, we talked about that case and about the jus-
tice system in which we both served in different ways.  James
Hopkins was a brilliant man, a sort of a renaissance scholar.  I
dedicated one of my early articles in the Yale Law Journal,
about overzealous government conduct, to Judge Hopkins.5  It
was a tribute to his wisdom, encouragement, and inspiration;
and I remember him as I deliver this lecture in his name.
B. Justice Robert Jackson
Another judge stands out.  He is a critical presence in this
lecture, as well as in my career as a prosecutor and occasional
critic of prosecutorial conduct and ethics.  Robert H. Jackson
was a lawyer from upstate New York—Jamesville, I believe—
who became an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
from 1941 to 1954.  He never graduated from law school.  He
was probably the most able lawyer and writer ever to have
served on the Supreme Court.  He was responsible for some of
the most famous opinions, ones that are familiar to every law
student—Michelson v. United States,6 Wickard v. Filburn,7
Hickman v. Taylor,8 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,9
Korematsu v. United States,10 West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette.11  He also invented several famous apho-
risms, such as, “We are not final because we are infallible, but
we are infallible only because we are final;”12 and that the con-
4. Id. at 516-17.
5. See Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrap-
ment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565 (1982).
6. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
7. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
8. 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (concurring opinion).
9. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (concurring opinion).
10. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
11. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
12. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/1
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stitution is not a “suicide pact.”13  However, he may be best
remembered not for what he wrote on the Court, but for his cou-
rageous and controversial decision to leave the Supreme Court
temporarily to serve as Chief Prosecutor in the Nuremberg War
Crimes Trials in 1945-46.  His opening and closing arguments
at those trials are said to be the finest courtroom oratory ever.
It has also been said that Jackson virtually invented the mod-
ern law of war crimes and trials for war crimes.
C. Justice Jackson’s Speech and My Title
As this lecture is about prosecutors, and, as you will learn
momentarily, about federal prosecutors and recent federal crim-
inal prosecutions, it is also noteworthy that Jackson, before he
was appointed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the
Supreme Court, served as the Attorney General of the United
States.  In that capacity, Jackson gave a memorable speech in
1940 at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attor-
neys.14  I’ve read that speech many times.  As a young assistant
district attorney in the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, I
can remember the impact his speech had on me, and how his
remarks helped shape my understanding and appreciation of
the awesome role of a prosecutor in the legal system.  A passage
from that speech provides the title to my lecture.
II. Recent Prosecutorial Abuses
In preparing for this lecture, I reviewed some of my other
lectures and writings over the past eight years.  I wanted to see
if the cases I will be discussing today were isolated events or
part of a larger picture, to try to place the cases in some concep-
tual framework.  I have concluded that these cases are not aber-
rations.  They are not isolated deviations, disconnected from the
legal and political abuses that have engulfed our nation these
past eight years, particularly the abuses by the Executive
Branch of our federal government, the erosion of the rule of law,
and the threats to our civil liberties.  There is a connection be-
13. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
14. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940-1941).
3
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tween these abuses and the specific topic I have assigned for my
talk.
Here’s the connection.  The post-9/11 legal and political cli-
mate of hysteria, panic, and fear has allowed the Executive
Branch to engage in the most odious and despicable conduct,
where the highest and most powerful government officials be-
lieve and teach that anything goes and the truth doesn’t matter,
as long as you can get away with it.  “Just trust me,” they say.
We are experiencing a dark period in our history in which the
rule of law is cynically manipulated to serve the government’s
partisan and political interests, and moral and ethical norms of
conduct are flaunted.  In such a climate, is there any question
that some prosecutors, whose moral code, aggressive law en-
forcement mentality, and political self-interest might be in sync
with the Department of Justice and the White House, might get
the message that they can prosecute as hard as they want, over-
reach as far as they are able, prosecute as dirty as they need to,
and there is nothing to stop them—not Congress, not the
courts, certainly not the Attorney General, the Justice Depart-
ment or other high executive branch officials?
A. What Kind of Climate am I Talking About?
1. Recall the post-9/11 roundup and detention of immi-
grants.  Some twelve hundred people were arrested, mostly for-
eigners with immigration problems, with wartime urgency and
uncommon secrecy, on the pretextual charges of being “material
witnesses.”  Seven hundred and sixty-two non-citizens were de-
tained and abused physically and mentally.15  Many were held
for months in detention facilities without being told why they
were being detained.16  These people effectively “disappeared.”
Most were deported, and none were charged with terrorist
crimes.17
2. Recall the abuses under the odious USA Patriot Act.
These abuses are exemplified by “sneak and peek searches” that
15. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEM-
BER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 2
(April 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf.
16. See id. at 35-36, 195.
17. See id. at 1-2, 52, 70, 88, 104.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/1
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violate the privacy of our most sacred sanctuaries; FBI access to
personal records without a warrant simply on the basis of a self-
proclaimed need for the information, with virtually no require-
ment of factual support; and unregulated surveillance of relig-
ious, civic and political organizations.  Several provisions have
been declared unconstitutional (e.g., use of “national security
letters,” prohibition on recipients from disclosing the requests,
dispensing with knowledge and intent requirements for serious
felonies).18
3. Recall the horrible images from the Abu Ghraib prison.
One commentator has described these images as some of the
most despicable examples of “official American sadism.”19
4. Recall the use of torture as a permissible method of inter-
rogation, with not only the endorsement of the Justice Depart-
ment, but the Orwellian definition of torture conjured up to
justify its use.
5. Recall the transportation of suspects to foreign countries
where, with our knowledge and consent, they were horribly
tortured.
6. Recall the Guantanamo gulag.  This is the notorious de-
tention center where persons, including some U.S. citizens,
denominated as “enemy combatants,” were detained indefi-
nitely—possibly forever—in unspeakably harsh conditions
without access to courts, lawyers, or family, and without formal
criminal charges or reliable evidence of wrongdoing.
7. Recall the Military Commission Act20 abolishing habeas
corpus and employing military tribunals to try enemy combat-
ants on often secret and unreliable evidence.
8. Recall the use of warrantless electronic eavesdropping,
endorsed by the Department of Justice.
9. Recall the intrusions into privileged communications be-
tween lawyers and their clients, endorsed by the Department of
Justice.
10. Recall the widespread INS raids on undocumented
aliens in the name of fighting terrorism, where husbands and
18. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382
(9th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
19. See Anthony Lewis, Official American Sadism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept.
25, 2008, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21794.
20. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-e (2006).
5
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wives, and parents and children were separated, without any
demonstrable contribution to fighting terrorism.
But there is another, more direct and more insidious con-
nection to the cases I will be discussing.  The last eight years
have seen what I will call the politicization of the rule of law.
From the standpoint of some federal prosecutors, there is no one
rule of law but rather one rule of law for Republicans and a
different rule of law for Democrats.
B. Consider the U.S. Attorney Firings
The discharge of eight U.S. Attorneys in late 2006—re-
ferred to as the “U.S. Attorneys Scandal”21—involved allega-
tions that the Department of Justice influenced—directed is a
more apt word—U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to follow President
Bush’s partisan political agenda by encouraging the inexorable
pursuit of voting rights cases and government corruption cases
against Democrats and discharging those U.S. Attorneys who
resisted.  The firings have been seen as proof of the Justice De-
partment’s eagerness to serve White House political interests in
derogation of the Department’s traditional commitment to the
rule of law and the cause of justice.
Last week, a report by the Inspector General of the Justice
Department concluded that “there was significant evidence that
political partisan considerations were an important factor” in
the U.S. attorney firings.22  This report caused Attorney Gen-
eral Michael Mukasey to appoint a special prosecutor to investi-
gate the scandal and determine whether certain individuals,
including former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, may have
committed criminal acts in connection with the firings.  Among
the allegations to be investigated are claims that:
1. Carol Lam of San Diego was fired because she secured
the conviction of Republican Congressman Randy Cunningham
and was in hot pursuit of defense contractors with close ties to
the administration.23
21. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and
the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 188 (2008).
22. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION
INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf.
23. See id. at 271.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/1
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2. Nevada prosecutor Daniel Bogden was fired for investi-
gating a Republican governor.24
3. Arkansas prosecutor H.E. Cummins was fired for investi-
gating the Republican governor of Missouri.25
4. Arizona prosecutor Paul Charlton was fired for failing to
bring charges against Democratic Congressman Rick Renzi just
before the November 2006 election.26
5. New Mexico prosecutor David Iglesias was fired because
he would not succumb to Republican political pressure to bring
charges against certain Democrats when he lacked sufficient
proof of guilt.27
6. Lastly, New Jersey U.S Attorney Christopher Christy es-
caped being fired because he publicly investigated Democratic
Senator Robert Menendez just before the New Jersey senatorial
election, which Menendez narrowly won.28
In addition to the firing scandal, we have the hiring scan-
dal, which further demonstrates the politicization of the rule of
law and the Justice Department’s utter contempt for govern-
ment.  There is no precedent in our history for how the Bush
Administration systematically politicized the Justice Depart-
ment throughout the bureaucracy.  Two recent reports from the
Inspector General conclude that there was a partisan litmus
test for Justice Department hirings, in violation of federal civil
service law as well as Justice Department guidelines.29  Among
the findings are the following:
24. See id. at 201.
25. See id. at 115.
26. See id. at 219.
27. See id. at 149; see also David Iglesias, Why I Was Fired, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2007, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/opinion/
21iglesias.html.
28. Green & Zacharias, supra note 21, at 205 n.85.
29. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION
OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HONORS
PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM 98-102 (2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0806/final.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HON-
ORS PROGRAM]; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTI-
GATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER
STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 135-40 (2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf [hereinafter U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MONICA GOODLING].
7
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1. Priority in hiring was given to persons who had loyally
served the President—the so-called loyal “Bushies.”  Applicants
were vetted aggressively.  According to the Inspector General’s
Report, hiring decisions were “so irrational that they [were] mo-
tivated by politics . . . .”30
2. Applicants with Democratic affiliations were rejected at
a substantially higher rate than those with Republican, con-
servative, or neutral credentials.  For example, dozens of honors
applicants with membership in the American Constitution Soci-
ety were rejected, but virtually all applicants with ties to the
Federalist Society were accepted.
3. As stated by the White house liaison to the Justice De-
partment in an email message, “We pledge 7 slots within 40
days and 40 nights.  Let the games begin!”31
4. When Bradley Schlozman, the U.S. Attorney in Kansas
City, Missouri, wanted to hire a new prosecutor, the Justice De-
partment’s liaison with the White House, Monica Goodling, who
had so much power and so little experience—and whom one
commentator has characterized as an inexperienced punk—bra-
zenly replied, “Tell Brad he can hire one more good American”32
(Goodling’s code word for Republican).
5. Republican lawyers received high marks in their job in-
terviews because they were found to be sufficiently conservative
on the core issues of “god, guns + gays.”33  After an interview
Goodling typically would write in her forwarding messages
things like “pro-God” and “pro-marriage, anti-civil union.”34
Goodling’s political influence generated complaints from
some U.S. Attorneys.  She tried to prevent the hiring of a prose-
cutor in the U.S. Attorneys Office in Washington D.C., because
she was concerned he was a “liberal democrat.”35  In another
case, Goodling actually blocked the appointment of a female
prosecutor in Michigan because Goodling believed the woman
was having a lesbian relationship.36  Goodling’s objections may
30. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HONORS PROGRAM, supra note 29, at 48.
31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE; MONICA GOODLING, supra note 29, at 94.
32. Id. at 31.
33. Id. at 104.
34. Id. at 38.
35. Id. at 135.
36. Id. at 128.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/1
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now explain the dismissal of the U.S. Attorney—one of the U.S.
Attorneys fired for reasons that have never been explained—in
that office.
Given these occurrences, the cases that I am about to de-
scribe seem to be almost inevitable byproducts of this partisan
and corrupt system.
C. Consider the Case of Georgia Thompson
The prosecution of Georgia Thompson defies reason.37
Thompson was a Wisconsin state procurement section chief and
career civil servant.  In 2006, she was convicted of misapplica-
tion of federal funds and mail fraud.38  These convictions were
based on charges that she improperly steered a large contract to
a travel agency whose principals had donated to Wisconsin
Democratic governor Jim Doyle’s campaign.39
Last year, the Seventh Circuit overturned Thompson’s con-
viction.40  The court found that no crime had been committed
and that the prosecution’s legal theory was “preposterous.”41
The evidence used to charge Thompson was beyond thin.42  In-
deed, on the day of oral argument, the court issued a remarka-
ble, and possibly unprecedented, order to the prosecutors to
release Thompson from prison before the close of business that
very day.43  An official in the Justice Department’s Public Integ-
rity section wrote an email message to a colleague asking,
“[H]ow in the heck did this case ever get brought?”44
As the Seventh Circuit observed in its decision declaring
Thompson “innocent,”45 (1) the travel agency had in fact submit-
ted the lowest bid,46 (2) “there [was] not so much as a whiff of a
37. See H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 110TH CONG., ALLEGATIONS OF SELECTIVE
PROSECUTION: THE EROSION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN OUR FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM 19-23 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY],
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/SelProsReport080417.pdf.
38. See United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 2007).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 883.
42. See H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 25.
43. United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007) (No.06-3676) (or-
der releasing Thompson, Apr. 5, 2007).
44. H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 20.
45. Thompson, 484 F.3d at 878.
46. Id.
9
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kickback or any similar impropriety,”47 and (3) there was no evi-
dence or even a contention by the prosecution that Thompson
either knew or cared about the winning bidder’s contributions.48
Although Thompson told other members of the bid-evaluation
committee that the winning bidder had to be selected for “politi-
cal reasons,”49 the Seventh Circuit observed that not all political
reasons are wrongful.  Such a comment could have meant that
awarding a contract to the cheapest bidder was good politics be-
cause it showed fiscal responsibility—a political but not a
wrongful reason.50  Or Thompson may have meant that the bid
should go to a Wisconsin company—a good political reason but
hardly an unlawful one.51
But note how important the Thompson prosecution was to
Wisconsin Republicans.  The prosecution became a powerful po-
litical weapon for Doyle’s Republican opponent.  Remember, he
was trying to unseat an incumbent Democratic governor.  Sure
enough, given the timing of the prosecution—the summer
before the election—the Republicans spent millions of dollars
running a barrage of attack ads tying Thompson’s corruption to
Governor Doyle.
During its investigation into political profiling by the Bush
Justice Department, the Judiciary Committee discovered sev-
eral unusual facts about the Thompson investigation.  First, the
name of the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Thompson—Steven
Biskupic—appeared on a March 2005 list of U.S. Attorneys to
be considered for firing that was compiled by Kyle Sampson.52
Sampson was the chief-of-staff to Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales just before the Thompson investigation took off.  It ap-
pears that Biskupic was targeted for firing because of Karl
Rove’s concern about Biskupic’s dismal record in bringing “vote
fraud” cases against Democrats.53  Documents show that Rove
personally reviewed Biskupic’s performance on such cases and
noted on a document discussing alleged vote-fraud activity in
47. Id. at 879.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 878.
50. Id. at 879-80.
51. Id. at 880.
52. H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 21.
53. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/1
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Biskupic’s district, “Discuss w/Harriet.”54  (Harriet, of course, is
Harriet Miers, counsel to Bush).  In January 2006, the same
month that Biskupic indicted Thompson, Kyle Sampson created
a new draft of the firing list with Biskupic’s name now
removed.55
D. Consider Next the Case of Don Siegelman56
Don Siegelman was the most powerful Democrat in Ala-
bama.  He was governor of Alabama from 1998-2002, previously
held many state offices, and was a major political force in the
state.  He lost his bid for re-election in 2002 to Republican Bob
Riley by a few thousand votes and was expected to run again in
2006.  Early polls indicated he would win a rematch against the
Republican.
In May 2004, Siegelman was indicted by the U.S. Attorney
for the Northern District of Alabama, Alice Martin, on conspir-
acy charges related to bid-rigging of state contracts.  Those
charges were dismissed after the prosecution failed to produce
evidence to support the allegations.  Several months later, a
new indictment was brought by the U.S. Attorney for the Mid-
dle District of Alabama, Leura Canary.57  This new indictment
charged Siegelman and Richard Scrushy, an Alabama business-
man who had also been charged in the earlier dismissed bid-
rigging case, with bribery.  According to the indictment,
Scrushy had made a $500,000 contribution to a state lottery
campaign favored by Siegelman in exchange for his appoint-
ment by Siegelman to a state medical board.58
Trial was held in mid-2006.  After eleven days of delibera-
tions, with the jury twice reporting that it was deadlocked, Sie-
gelman and Scrushy were acquitted of twenty-five of the thirty-
two counts submitted to the jury, but were convicted of the brib-
ery charge.59  Siegelman was sentenced to seven years and four
months in prison60 (prosecutors had requested thirty years) and
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 7-19.
57. See United States v. Siegelman, No. 2:05-cr-119, 2008 WL 45531, at *1
(M.D. Ala. Jan. 2, 2008).
58. Siegelman, 2008 WL 45531, at *1.
59. Id. at *7.
60. Id.
11
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Scrushy to six years and ten months.61  The district judge de-
nied Siegelman’s motion to remain at liberty pending appeal.62
Last March, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Siegelman released
from prison, stating that his appeal raised “substantial ques-
tions of law or fact likely to result in a reversal,” one of the es-
sential requirements for release pending appeal.63  The appeal
is scheduled to be argued later this month.
Serious allegations have been made that Siegelman was
targeted for prosecution to further the interests of the Alabama
Republican Party.  Indeed, forty-four former state attorneys
general, of both political parties, have petitioned the House Ju-
diciary Committee to commence an inquiry into the Siegelman
case.64  One of them, a former Republican state Attorney Gen-
eral, stated, “This was a Republican state and [Siegelman] was
the one Democrat they could never get rid of.”65
Did politics play a role in Siegelman’s prosecution?  In May
2007, a Republican attorney from Northern Alabama, Jill Simp-
son, swore in an affidavit that in November 2002, a prominent
Alabama Republican operative, Bill Canary, told her that Karl
Rove had contacted the Justice Department about bringing a
prosecution against Don Siegelman.  Canary, by the way, is
married to the same U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of
Alabama, Leura Canary, who, despite her recusal, appears to
have been heavily involved in the Siegelman case.  Simpson
stated in her affidavit that Canary also told her that “his girls
would take care of Siegelman.”  When Simpson asked Canary
who “his girls” were, Canary replied they were his wife and Al-
ice Martin, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ala-
bama, the same prosecutor who had previously brought the
charges against Siegelman that were dismissed.
61. United States v. Scrushy, No. 2:05-cr-119, 2007 WL 3231788, at *1 (M.D.
Ala. Nov. 1, 2007).
62. Siegelman, 2008 WL 45531 at *7.
63. United States v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163B (11th Cir. Mar. 27, 2008) (or-
der releasing Siegelman pending appeal), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.
com/packages/pdf/national/20080328-ALABAMA.pdf.
64. H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 8.
65. Did Ex-Alabama Governor Get A Raw Deal?, CBSNEWS.COM, Feb. 24,
2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/21/60minutes/main3859830.shtml
(quoting Grant Woods, former (Republican) Attorney General of Arizona).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/1
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In a later sworn interview with the Judiciary Committee,
Simpson further stated that Republican Governor Riley’s son
Rob, an attorney, colleague, and friend of Simpson, told her that
his father and Canary had spoken to Karl Rove.  Thereafter, she
continued, Rove communicated with the head of the Justice De-
partment’s Public Integrity Section about mobilizing additional
resources to bring a second indictment against Siegelman after
the first case in Birmingham had been dismissed.  Riley also
told Simpson that the new case would be before Chief Judge
Mark Fuller, a judge who Riley said could be trusted to “hang
Don Siegelman.”66
Canary and Riley have denied the allegations, although
both have refused to be interviewed under oath.  Rove has made
a curiously ambiguous comment to the media (“I know nothing
about any phone call”67), but never addressed the underlying
allegations.  There is evidence to corroborate Simpson’s
statements:
1. Simpson’s cell phone records reflect an eleven minute
call to Riley’s number on the morning she says she spoke to him
about Siegelman.68
2. When first confronted about the Simpson allegations,
Riley stated that Simpson was a distant acquaintance whom he
had not seen in thirteen or fourteen years.69  However, records
show that over the past ten years, there was extensive joint le-
gal work and client referral between Simpson and Riley.70
3. Further, although Riley stated that Rove “has no idea
who [I am],”71 Time magazine reported that one of Simpson and
Riley’s joint clients recalls “Rob Riley mention[ing] Karl Rove
about four or five times as someone he was getting in touch with
to help settle our business in Washington.”72
4. Finally, at the time of the charges, Riley was involved in
a huge civil lawsuit against Scrushy’s company, and other coun-
sel in that case had commented that the existence of a criminal
66. H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 9.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 11.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. citing Adam Zagorin, Rove Linked to Alabama Case, TIME, Oct. 10,
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/0,8599,1669990,00.html.
72. Id.
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\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR101.txt unknown Seq: 14 27-FEB-09 14:04
14 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1
indictment against Scrushy “obviously helped” the civil case.73
The case settled for $445 million, yielding a substantial fee to
Riley and further corroborating Simpson’s testimony that Riley
had been discussing Scrushy’s status in late 2004 into 2005.74
Further evidence reveals that high-level Washington offi-
cials may have been driving the prosecution effort against Sie-
gelman.  Doug Jones, a former U.S. Attorney in Alabama who
had previously represented Siegelman, gave sworn testimony
before the Judiciary Committee that government investigators
stated that they “hoped” their work would implicate Siegelman,
and that other prosecutors told him that despite significant
weaknesses in the case, Washington officials had directed them
to go back and review the case from top to bottom.75  Witnesses
who did not know each other testified that at the time Karl
Rove was pressing Justice Department leadership to indict Sie-
gelman, the highest officials in the Justice Department in-
formed line prosecutors working on the case, who had expressed
serious doubts about the evidence and opposed the prosecution,
to go back over the entire matter.76  Indeed, these prosecutors
did in fact launch an aggressive new effort to find indictable
charges against Siegelman.  As Jones testified, “[I]t appeared
that agents were not investigating any allegations of a crime,
but were fishing around for anything they could find against an
individual.”77
The aggressive theory of bribery relied on by the prosecu-
tion supports Jones’s observation.  The investigation against
Siegelman was unusually long and far-ranging, cycling and re-
cycling multiple theories and allegations for over five years
before an indictment was brought, then dismissed, and another
brought.78  Scrushy’s payment was neither to Siegelman nor to
his campaign.  Siegelman personally received nothing.  Scrushy
previously had been appointed to the exact same medical board
by Republican governors.79  Moreover, criminalizing campaign
donations because the giver later receives a benefit is not only
73. H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 11.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.
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unusual, it runs directly counter to a 1991 Supreme Court deci-
sion, McCormick v. United States,80 that requires an explicit
quid pro quo, or link, between a campaign or issue-advocacy
contribution and an official act.81
Consider this: If Siegelman is guilty, then every President
who has appointed a campaign contributor as an Ambassador
and every Senator who has put forward a nominee for a federal
judgeship after such person contributed to the Senator’s cam-
paign would be chargeable at the whim of prosecutors.  The
criminal law cannot be so malleable.  Allowing prosecutors such
wide opportunities for charging invites prosecutorial tyranny.
People should be allowed to stay within the accepted bounds of
the law without fearing prosecution from some unscrupulous
prosecutor.  I am reminded of Sir Thomas More’s statement, as
recounted by Robert Bolt in his play A Man for All Seasons:
“The law is a causeway upon which, so long as he keeps to it, a
citizen may walk safely.”82
To be free of prosecutorial selectiveness—of prosecutorial
tyranny—the causeway’s edges need to be clearly marked.  The
McCormick case marks the boundaries of the legal causeway in-
sofar as bribery charges may be prosecuted.  Indeed, the U.S.
Attorney’s bribery prosecution of Siegelman, predicated on is-
sue-advocacy campaign contributions, may be the first such
case ever brought by a federal prosecutor.
Was Siegelman a victim of prosecutorial tyranny based on
his prominent political status?  Did the prosecution apply a
double standard?  A key witness against Siegelman told investi-
gators that he had made payments and provided free campaign
items to Republican politicians in Alabama exactly like those to
Siegelman.  Many of these Republicans were close friends of Bill
Canary, whose wife Leura, as previously noted, was the U.S.
Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama at the time.  None
of these allegations against Republicans were ever investigated
at all, much less for over five years.  In fact, Time magazine re-
ported that although substantial allegations of corruption were
made against Republican Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, no
80. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
81. Id. at 273-74.
82. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 153 (Vintage International 1990)
(1960).
15
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one ever contacted the Senator’s office to investigate these
allegations.83
E. Finally, Consider the Case of Dr. Cyril Wecht
My third example of charging abuse by federal prosecutors
involves Pennsylvania U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan’s de-
cision to prosecute Dr. Cyril Wecht.84  Wecht, then the coroner
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, was a prominent 76-year-
old Democrat, frequently a candidate and holder of elective pub-
lic office, and an outspoken critic of Republican candidates, of-
ficeholders, and policies.85
Like the prosecutions against Siegelman and Thompson,
the charge against Wecht was predicated on an extraordinary
and arguably unprecedented legal theory.  Wecht was alleged to
have misused his office and personally enriched himself by a
deal with a local university to trade unclaimed cadavers for uni-
versity lab space.86  Why was this a federal prosecution?  It has
been contended that Buchanan expanded the mail fraud statute
so far into state government that it could be used to regulate
the taking of pencils from the office supply cabinet.87  Legal ex-
perts examining the charges concluded that Buchanan “improp-
erly crafted a federal case out of alleged violations of Home Rule
Charters, County Codes and State Ethics Provisions . . . .”88
Moreover, despite ample evidence of Republican corruption
in her jurisdiction, Buchanan, since beginning her tenure as
U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania in 2001,
has never brought a corruption charge against any Republican
official and has only prosecuted officeholders who are Demo-
crats.89  In addition to Wecht, Buchanan conducted highly visi-
ble grand jury investigations during the run up to the 2006
elections against the former Democratic Mayor of Pittsburgh
and the former Democratic Sheriff of Allegheny County.90  She
83. See Adam Zagorin, Selective Justice in Alabama?, TIME, October 4, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1668220,00.html.
84. See H. COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37, at 23-26.
85. See id. at 23.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 23.
90. Id.
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declined to prosecute former Republican Senator Rick
Santorum for allegedly defrauding a local community by claim-
ing a false residence.91  In the one instance where a Republican,
Jeff Habay, was prosecuted for using paid staffers for political
campaigning, Buchanan took no action and let the local prose-
cutor handle the case instead.92
In addition to the charges against Wecht, Buchanan’s tac-
tics in the case were outrageous.  For example, claiming that
Wecht posed a risk of flight to Israel, Buchanan advised defense
lawyers that she would immediately arrest Wecht and subject
him to a “perp walk” in front of the media.  Only after one of
Wecht’s lawyers interceded with Deputy Attorney General
McNultey in Washington, D.C. did Buchanan agree to allow
Wecht to surrender in lieu of arrest and not to subject him to
the “perp walk.”93
The two-month trial ended with the government putting on
over forty witnesses and the defense resting without calling any
witnesses.  After ten days of deliberation the jury reported it
was deadlocked and the judge declared a mistrial.  The prosecu-
tion announced it would retry the case.94  Subsequently, a mem-
ber of the jury revealed that a majority of the jurors thought
Wecht was innocent.95  As noted in news reports, several jurors
were concerned that the case was politically driven.  Local con-
cerns were heightened by news that the prosecution had dis-
patched FBI agents to visit members of the jury.  Finally, a
bipartisan group of Republican and Democratic citizens of the
Western District of Pennsylvania have written to Attorney Gen-
eral Mukasey urging that the decision to retry Wecht be
reconsidered.96
F. What Can We Say About These Cases?
All of these cases share some common elements.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 23 n.131.
93. Id. at 24.
94. Id. at 25-26.
95. Id. at 26.
96. Id.
17
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1. Each of these prosecutions occurred roughly at the same
time period—during the tenure of Attorney General Gonzales—
when the politicization of the Department of Justice was at its
highest, overlapping the U.S. Attorney firing scandal.  That
time period was close enough to the 2006 elections to have a
political impact.
2. Every one of these prosecutions involved prominent,
strategically placed, or outspoken Democrats whose prosecution
had the potential to severely cripple the Democratic Party.
3. In every district in which these cases were prosecuted,
there was demonstrable and equally culpable conduct by Re-
publican officials that was not investigated or prosecuted.
4. In each of these cases, the prosecutor used a strained and
sometimes unprecedented legal theory for prosecution.
5. In each of these cases, the factual predicate for charging
was weak or nonexistent.
6. In each of these cases, there were leaks to the media by
the prosecution alerting the public to the investigation, the
presentation of evidence to the grand jury, and the subpoenaing
of witnesses to maximize the political damage to Democrats, not
to mention the threatened “perp walk” of Wecht.
7. Consider one final point.  In each of these cases there is
reason to believe that the prosecutors didn’t care whether they
won a conviction or not.  Yes, prosecutors want to win.  But if
you’ve taken out your enemy, forced him to expend considerable
resources to defend, destroyed his reputation, and produced an
avalanche of publicity that impaired his and his party’s chances
of  winning an upcoming election, is it plausible that some pros-
ecutors might consider that a win?
I need to digress for a moment.  Juries convicted these de-
fendants, you might say, so how can I disparage the factual ba-
sis for the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges?
Juries make mistakes.  We know that all too well.  Just con-
sider the hundreds of recent DNA exonerations and many other
non-DNA exonerations: all of those defendants were found
guilty by juries.  The Wecht jurors resisted; the Thompson and
Siegelman jurors succumbed.
Why?  As anyone familiar with criminal trials knows, one
major reason is that the prosecutor, in his or her role as repre-
sentative of the government, has a unique power to affect the
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/1
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evaluation of the facts by the jury.  The jury sees the prosecutor
as a special guardian and thus warrantor of the facts—an ex-
pert who can be trusted to use the facts responsibly.  A jury
views the prosecutor not simply as an advocate but as a federal
official duty-bound to see that justice is done (and prosecutors,
by the way, typically make that point explicitly to a jury).  Thus,
given the enormous respect jurors have for the prosecutor, it
may be difficult for a jury to ignore the prosecutor’s arguments,
however biased and baseless they may in fact be, or to acknowl-
edge that the government would prosecute someone who wasn’t
guilty.
III. Scope and Limitations on Prosecutorial Discretion
Robert Jackson told his audience of U.S. attorneys that a
prosecutor “has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America.”97  With such enormous
power one would think there would be some significant control
over a prosecutor’s decision-making.  But ironically, a prosecu-
tor’s decision to institute criminal charges is the broadest and
least regulated power in U.S. law.  The prosecutor—and only
the prosecutor—decides whom to charge, what charges to bring,
and whether a defendant will stand trial, plead guilty, receive
immunity, or enter a correctional program in lieu of charges.
The prosecutor’s authority over these critical decisions is
absolute.  A prosecutor cannot be forced to bring charges he
doesn’t want to or forced to terminate them.  The tone in the
courts’ decisions is less judicial restraint than judicial with-
drawal, treating the prosecutor as such an integral and expert
part of the executive branch that he may not be interfered with
by the judiciary.  As the Supreme Court forcefully stated in
United States v. Armstrong,98 “so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.”99  Moreover, probable cause, as many
97. Jackson, supra note 14, at 3.
98. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
99. Id. at 464 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
19
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of you are aware, is a far lesser standard than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A. Dangers of Unchecked Discretion
There is a certain irony, and some nostalgia, in rereading
Justice Jackson’s speech in which he describes the constitu-
tional and ethical obligations of prosecutors to an audience com-
posed of the most powerful prosecutors in the United States,
persons holding the same office as those who were involved in
the prosecutions described above.  Justice Jackson recognized
that law enforcement is not automatic; it isn’t blind.  The pur-
suit of justice requires independence, impartiality, and a spirit
of fair play and decency.  You should be “diligent, strict, and
vigorous in law enforcement,” he said, but “you can also afford
to be just.  Although the government technically loses its case, it
has really won if justice has been done.”100  He went on:
One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prose-
cutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prose-
cutor can investigate all of the cases in which he
receives complaints. . . .  What every prosecutor is
practically required to do is to select the cases for pros-
ecution and to select those in which the offense is the
most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the
proof the most certain.
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it
follows that he can choose his defendants.  Therein is
the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he
will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather
than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. . . .  It is
here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the
real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the
predominant or governing group, being attached to the
wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to
or in the way of the prosecutor himself.101
100. Jackson, supra note 14, at 4.
101. Id. at 5.
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\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR101.txt unknown Seq: 21 27-FEB-09 14:04
2008] DANGEROUS POWER OF THE PROSECUTOR 21
B. What are the Limits or Controls on a Prosecutor’s
Charging Discretion?
I would suggest that there are both internal and external
constraints to prosecutorial discretion.
1. Internal Controls
These constraints assume prosecutorial good faith and no
improper motivation.
i. Legal considerations: These include the prosecutor’s
evaluation of the strength of the case, the credibility of wit-
nesses, the existence of corroborating evidence, and the nature
and strength of the defense.
ii. Policy considerations: These include an assessment
of the harm caused by the offense, availability of investigative
and litigation resources, existence of non-criminal alternatives,
and alertness to relevant social and community concerns.
iii. Experiential considerations: These include the pros-
ecutor’s background, training, experience, judgment, intuition,
sense of fair play, and decency.
iv. Ethical considerations: Stated briefly, the prosecu-
tor must ask whether the ends of justice would be served by this
criminal prosecution.
2. External Controls
There are two kinds of external controls.  The first category
is the sanctions against prosecutors for abuse and misconduct
in bringing a prosecution.  The second is the constitutional lim-
its in bringing charges.
i. Disqualification and superseding of prosecutors:
Courts and attorneys general have the power to remove or dis-
qualify a prosecutor on grounds of misconduct or a conflict of
interest.  The most recent example of a prosecutor being re-
moved is the Duke Lacrosse case, in which District Attorney
Michael Nifong was removed and replaced by the North Caro-
lina Attorney General.
ii. Civil damage action against a prosecutor: The key
question here is whether a prosecutor is acting as an investiga-
tor or advocate.  When acting as an advocate—and charging
21
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and prosecuting a crime typically embraces the advocacy func-
tion—a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability.
iii. Monetary sanctions under the so-called Hyde
Amendment: If a defendant who has prevailed either through
dismissal of charges or acquittal can demonstrate that the pros-
ecutor’s conduct was “vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith,” the
defendant can recover attorneys fees and other litigation
expenses.102
iv. Discipline by the legal profession: This happens too
rarely to be an effective sanction.  Nifong was disbarred, not for
bringing spurious charges, but for misconduct in making im-
proper statements to the media and hiding exculpatory
evidence.
v. Criminal prosecution: This hardly ever happens.
Criminal charges were brought recently against prosecutors in
Dupage, Illinois and Detroit, Michigan for using false evidence
at trial.  All of those prosecutors were acquitted after trial.
If a prosecutor charges with an improper motivation, con-
stitutional and other legal checks are theoretically available
but, as we shall see, provide extremely limited protection.
1. Vindictive and Retaliatory Charging
Two Supreme Court decisions—North Carolina v. Pearce103
and Blackledge v. Perry104—are the foundation for the doctrine,
grounded in due process, that forbids a prosecutor from retali-
ating against a defendant by bringing new or enhanced charges
after a defendant has exercised legal rights.  The theory is that
a defendant should be free to invoke constitutional or statutory
rights without the fear that a prosecutor will retaliate against
him.105
The vindictiveness doctrine has been raised in a variety of
procedural contexts with very limited success.  Indeed, it has
been held to be unavailable in the pre-trial context.106  Thus, for
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1997).
103. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
104. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
105. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 4:34-37 (2d ed.
2008) (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724).
106. See id. § 4:39-49.
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a defendant who refuses to plead guilty and thereby invokes his
constitutional right to a trial, the vindictiveness doctrine does
not apply.107  There are very few cases where courts have actu-
ally sustained the defense, usually because the prosecutor is
able to establish that his charging decision was motivated, not
by a retaliatory purpose, but on evidentiary or other permissible
considerations.108
In the cases above, there is no claim that vindictiveness
motivated the prosecutors’ charging decisions.  To be sure, for
some of these prosecutors, or administration officials who may
have incited these prosecutions, there may have been a desire
for political retribution.  However, under the elements of the
vindictiveness doctrine, there is no evidence that these defend-
ants were charged with a crime after they invoked any of their
legal rights, the key requirement under the doctrine.
2. Demagogic Charging
Prosecutors sometimes bring charges for personal reasons.
I have labeled these prosecutions “demagogic” because they re-
flect illegitimate personal considerations as opposed to proper
law enforcement objectives.  Tell-tale signs of this practice often
include the appearance of personal vendettas, witch hunts, and
political crusades.  In Younger v. Harris,109 the Supreme Court
referred to such prosecutions as “official lawlessness”110 and au-
thorized federal courts to enjoin them.111   Injunctions of this
sort are hardly ever granted and always involve state prosecu-
tions.  It is possible that the notorious Duke Lacrosse case may
be an example of a prosecution brought for personal reasons
that could have been enjoined.
A better example is the case of Shaw v. Garrison,112 cap-
tured most inaccurately in the film JFK, where Jim Garrison,
the District Attorney of New Orleans, began investigating the
assassination of President Kennedy ostensibly because Lee
Harvey Oswald had spent the summer of 1963 in New Orleans.
107. See id. § 4:42.
108. See id. § 4:40-67.
109. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
110. Id. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring).
111. See id. at 53-54 (majority opinion).
112. 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971).
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Garrison focused his investigation on a businessman, Clay
Shaw, after the release of the Warren Commission Report.113  In
1967, he charged Shaw with conspiring to assassinate Ken-
nedy.114  Shaw was tried and acquitted, but on the day after the
acquittal, Garrison re-charged Shaw with perjury based on his
testimony at the conspiracy trial.115  The district court enjoined
this prosecution, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.116  The Fifth
Circuit found that the prosecution had been brought in bad
faith for venal motives.117  One of these motives was Garrison’s
desire for financial gain from his forthcoming book on the Ken-
nedy assassination, which would be promoted by the publicity
surrounding the Shaw prosecutions and would help Garrison
repay substantial debts incurred in his funding of the original
investigation.118  Garrison’s “relentless harassment of Shaw”
and his “total disregard of Shaw’s rights” placed this case
squarely within the Younger v. Harris doctrine.119
Although there have been notorious political trials that
seem to fit into the category of witch hunts, I have found no
federal case in which a federal prosecution has been enjoined.  I
can recall the “Chicago Seven” trial in 1971,120 which might be
characterized as a “witch-hunt.”
In the three cases discussed above, one could argue that
prosecutors brought these charges for personal reasons, that is,
that they would stand to gain personally by avoiding being fired
and would also ingratiate themselves with the White House and
Justice Department.  It is plausible to characterize these cases
as demagogic based on the personal and political stakes in-
volved.  However correct this characterization may be, I have
found no case applying the Younger v. Harris doctrine to federal
prosecutions.
113. Id. at 393-94.
114. Id. at 394.
115. Id. at 399-400.
116. 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1972).
117. Id. at 120.
118. Id. at 118.
119. Id. at 114, 117.
120. See generally United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (1972).
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3. Selective Prosecution—Discriminatory Charging
This doctrine may be a better fit.  The equal protection doc-
trine typically is applied to address claims of discriminatory
charging.  The label given to such claims is “selective prosecu-
tion,” and it is under this doctrine that the recent cases I have
discussed may best be considered.  The doctrine, or defense, of
selective prosecution contains several elements familiar to
equal protection jurisprudence generally.121  Three elements
must be shown.
i. Arbitrary classification: The Supreme Court has
stated that the conscious exercise of some selectivity is not an
improper or constitutional violation (i.e., the most notorious vio-
lators or the most prominent persons who may be violating a
law).122  Selection, however, may not be based on “an unjustifi-
able standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifi-
cation.”123  An arbitrary classification would seem to mean that
prosecutors are targeting persons for prosecution based on cri-
teria that are clearly irrelevant to law enforcement purposes.
Such a classification would include the exercise of protected
constitutional and statutory rights and would embrace political
activities, membership in a political party, and more generally
the exercise of First Amendment rights.
ii. Disproportionate impact: A showing must be made
that while persons in a particular class are being prosecuted,
the law in question generally is not being enforced against other
persons who are similarly situated or equally culpable.124
iii. Discriminatory purpose: As in all equal protection
cases, there must be proof that the selection was consciously
and deliberately made based on the unjustifiable standard.125
In other words, there must be proof that the prosecutor singled
out individuals for prosecution because of their membership in a
political party, or because of their exercise of First Amendment
rights.
121. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
122. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
123. Id.
124. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
125. See id. at 464.
25
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4. Analysis of These Cases Under These Elements
i. Is there an arbitrary classification?
Political affiliation is a proper consideration in making po-
litical appointments.  It is improper as a criterion in hiring deci-
sions for career lawyers under federal civil service law and
Justice Department guidelines.  It is also an absolutely im-
proper and illegal factor in making charging decisions.  Several
Supreme Court cases—Elrod v. Burns,126 Branti v. Finkel,127
and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois128—stand for the prin-
ciple that targeting defendants because of their political affilia-
tion is an arbitrary selection.
ii. Is there a disproportionate impact?
We know that in the cases discussed, the prosecutors al-
ways investigated Democrats for official corruption and almost
never investigated Republicans.  A study by Donald Shields and
John Cragan of the investigation and prosecution by U.S. Attor-
neys Offices between 2001-2007 of 820 elected officials (norma-
tive data:  fifty percent Democrat, forty-one percent Republican,
nine percent Independent) determined that during the Bush ad-
ministration, seventy-seven percent of federal public corruption
cases involved Democratic officeholders and only seventeen per-
cent involved Republican officeholders.129  Shields and Cragan
also determined that during the Bush administration, eighty
percent of federal investigations and/or indictments of local offi-
cials involved Democrats and a mere fourteen percent involved
Republicans,130 a number that exceeds racial profiling of Afri-
can Americans in traffic stops.  Shields and Cragan found that
the administration’s investigations of Democrats were “highly
disproportionate” and stated that the odds were “less than one
in 10,000” that the overrepresentation of Democrats occurred by
126. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
127. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
128. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
129. Donald C. Shields, Re-Visiting and Extending the “Political Profiling of
Elected Democratic Officials,” EPLURIBUS MEDIA, Oct. 24, 2007, http://
www.epluribusmedia.org/columns/2007/20071019_political_profiling_2.html. See
also Donald C. Shields & John F. Cragan, The Political Profiling of Elected Demo-
cratic Officials: When Rhetorical Vision Participation Runs Amok, EPLURIBUS ME-
DIA, Feb. 18, 2007, http://www.epluribusmedia.org/columns/2007/20070212_
political_profiling.html.
130. Shields, supra note 129.
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chance.  They concluded that selective prosecution of Democrats
must have occurred.131
iii. Is there a discriminatory purpose?
To prove a charge of selective prosecution, the defendant
must show that he was chosen for prosecution because of an il-
legitimate factor—here, his or her political affiliation.  Al-
though there is no direct evidence of discriminatory motivation,
and there rarely is in any criminal prosecution, the circumstan-
tial evidence is compelling:
- The nature of the crime (stale, unusual, political, common-
place) reveals a mindset bent on prosecuting a person rather
than a crime.
- The identity of the target suggests the prosecution of pow-
erful and strategically placed Democrats that would have a ben-
eficial political impact.
- The timing of the prosecutions and the leaks to the media
were calculated to have a maximum partisan and political effect
and do the most political damage.
- Other equally situated Republican officials were not pros-
ecuted notwithstanding evidence of wrongdoing, again re-
vealing a discriminatory mindset.
- Finally, in the context of the U.S. Attorney firings and the
Justice Department hiring scandal, it is clear that political affil-
iation was a critical factor in the Justice Department’s policies
and practices at the time.  The above study by Shields and Cra-
gan demonstrates that the odds that the federal prosecutions of
Democrats occurred by chance are one in ten thousand.
IV. Conclusion
I have used this lecture to examine the role of the prosecu-
tor in the charging process.  The cases I have discussed reveal
an abuse of the prosecutor’s charging power that, considered
collectively, is unprecedented in U.S. criminal jurisprudence.
Given the refusal of persons, who may be able to shed light on
the actual motivations behind these prosecutors, to testify, the
full story of these prosecutions may never be known, and there-
131. Id.
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fore official accountability for these abuses may never be as-
signed to anyone.
Georgia Thompson has been exonerated, although she en-
dured a terrible ordeal of criminal investigation, prosecution,
conviction, and incarceration.  Dr. Cyril Wecht faces a new trial,
even though virtually every objective observer, including most
of the jurors, believe that the charges were baseless and politi-
cally motivated.  Don Siegelman’s appeal will be heard soon.  As
an example of a political witch-hunt, his case may be without
parallel.
As I reflect on the prosecutors and prosecutions discussed
in this lecture, I would like to end where I began, with a quote
from Robert Jackson’s speech to the U.S. Attorneys, an office
that has historically enjoyed an outstanding reputation for in-
dependence, impartiality, and the fair-minded pursuit of jus-
tice, but which, for the past eight years, has seen that
reputation severely tarnished and the quality of justice stained.
We want good prosecutors; we need good prosecutors.  De-
spite internal and external controls, the most effective control
over a prosecutor’s abuse of power may lie in a prosecutor’s own
personal integrity, his or her commitment to the cause of jus-
tice, and in a prosecutorial culture that prizes justice and fair
play over winning a case.
Or, as articulated by Justice Jackson:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as
impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman.
And those who need to be told would not understand it
anyway.  A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsman-
ship is perhaps the best protection against the abuse
of power, and the citizen’s safety lies in the prosecutor
who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks
truth and not victims, who serves the law and not fac-
tional purposes, and who approaches his task with
humility.132
132. Jackson, supra note 14, at 6.
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